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Objectivity	  in	  Confirmation:	  





The	  study	  of	  confirmation	  is	  the	  study	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  piece	  of	  evidence	  supports,	  or	  
ought	  to	  support,	  a	  hypothesis	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  level	  of	  that	  support.	  There	  are	  two	  major	  kinds	  of	  
confirmation	  theories,	  objective	  and	  subjective.	  Objective	  theories	  hold	  that	  confirmation	  questions	  
are	  settled	  by	  purely	  objective	  considerations.	  Subjective	  ones	  hold	  that	  at	  least	  some	  non-­‐objective	  
considerations	   come	   into	   play.	   With	   some	   exceptions	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Williamson	   2010),	   most	  
confirmation	  theorists	  nowadays	  opt	  for	  subjective	  theories.	  The	  pessimism	  over	  objective	  theories	  is	  
most	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   it	  has	  proved	  very	  hard,	  some	  may	  even	  say	   impossible,	  to	  find	  
reasonable	  principles	  that	  decide	  questions	  about	  confirmation	  in	  purely	  objective	  terms.	  The	  aim	  of	  
this	   paper	   is	   to	   reverse	   some	   of	   that	   pessimism	   by	   putting	   in	   place	   some	   cornerstones	   in	   the	  
foundations	  for	  an	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  considering	  lessons	  not	  from	  
the	  failures	  of	  subjective	  theories,	  of	  which,	  no	  doubt,	  there	  are	  many,	  but	  rather	  from	  the	  failures	  of	  
a	  certain	  kind	  of	  mini-­‐theory	  of	  confirmation,	  namely	  predictivism,	   that	   is	   typically	  conceived	  of	  as	  
objective.	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  Completion	  Challenge	  
Imagine	  a	  scientist	  S	  who	  endorses	  a	  hypothesis	  H	  but	  is	  confronted	  with	  incontrovertible	  evidence	  E	  
that	  contradicts	  H.	  Unless	  S	  is	  a	  defeatist,	  two	  options	  seem	  to	  be	  available.	  S	  can	  attempt	  to	  either	  
modify	  H	  or	  else	  construct	  an	  entirely	  new	  hypothesis.	  Whatever	  the	  chosen	  option,	  S	  will	  have	  to	  
ensure	   that	   the	   hypothesis	   endorsed	   stands	   in	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   inferential-­‐semantical	   relations,	  
ideally	  the	  entailment	  of	  true	  propositions,	  to	  the	  wayward	  and	  other	  established	  empirical	  results.	  
More	   subtle	   options	   become	   available	   if	   the	   example	   is	   modified	   a	   little.	   Suppose	   that	   ¬E	   is	   not	  
entailed	   by	   H	   alone	   but	   by	   a	   cluster	   of	   claims	   which	   includes	   H.	   Duhem	   ([1914]	   1991)	   famously	  
argued	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   situation	   is	   not	   the	   exception	   but	   the	   unexceptional	   rule.	   Hypotheses,	  
according	  to	  him,	  cannot	  be	  tested	  in	  isolation,	  for	  they	  have	  no	  testable	  consequences	  on	  their	  own.	  
To	   derive	   such	   consequences	   additional	   assumptions,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘auxiliaries’,	   are	   needed,	   e.g.	  
assumptions	   about	   initial	   and	   boundary	   conditions.	   Thus	   when	   evidence	   contradicts	   a	   given	  
consequence,	   it	   may	   not	   be	   immediately	   obvious	   where	   the	   blame	   lies.	   In	   the	   case	   under	  
consideration,	  all	  we	  know	  is	  that	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  claims	  in	  the	  cluster	  is	  the	  culprit.	  This	  opens	  up	  
the	  available	  options.	  S	  can	  attempt	  to	  modify	  or	  replace	  (anew)	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  existing	  claims	  in	  
the	   cluster.	   Hereafter,	   and	   for	   simplicity,	   I	   will	   often	   talk	   of	   a	   hypothesis	   being	   confirmed	   or	  
disconfirmed	  instead	  of	  a	  cluster	  of	  hypothesis	  plus	  auxiliaries	  although	  the	  latter	  is	  intended.	  
	  
A	  question	  that	  emerges	  at	  this	  point	  is	  whether	  E	  confirms	  the	  new	  hypothesis	  or	  the	  modified	  one	  
regardless	  of	  how	  S	  went	  about	  making	  sure	  that	  E	  stands	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential-­‐semantical	  
relations	   to	   the	  chosen	  hypothesis.	  Those	  who	  answer	  this	  question	   in	   the	  affirmative	  endorse	  the	  
view	  that	  standing	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential-­‐semantical	  relations,	  e.g.	  the	  logical	  entailment	  of	  
true	  propositions,	   is	   sufficient	   for	   confirmation.1	  Various	   confirmation	   theorists	  nowadays	   consider	  
this	  view	  false.	  The	  contrary	  view	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  one	  can	  arrange	  a	  hypothesis	  
to	  stand	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential-­‐semantical	  relations	  to	  the	  evidence.	  Thus	  Worrall	  complains:	  
	  
If	  having	  the	  right	  empirical	  consequences	  is	  the	  only	  criterion	  [for	  confirmation],	  then	  since	  any	  core	  
idea	   can	   be	   incorporated	   into	   a	   theoretical	   system	   that	   has	   the	   right	   consequences,	   there	   is	   no	  
empirically-­‐based	  rational	  preference	  for	  any	  such	  core	  idea	  over	  any	  other	  (2002,	  p.	  193).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  We	  assume	  that	  standing	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential	  relations	  is	  at	  least	  necessary	  for	  confirmation.	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Laudan	   and	   Leplin	   (1991)	   even	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   claim	   that	   “[n]o	  philosopher	   of	   science	   is	  willing	   to	  
grant	  evidential	  status	  to	  a	  result	  e	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  hypothesis	  H	  just	  because	  e	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  
H”	  (p.	  466).	  Echoing	  these	  complaints	  but	  targeting	  not	  just	  logical	  entailment	  but	  also	  probabilistic	  
relations,	  Hitchcock	  and	  Sober	  note:	  “Accommodation	  is	  easy.	  It	  is	  always	  possible,	  after	  the	  fact,	  to	  
come	   up	   with	   some	   hypothesis	   or	   other	   that	   accommodates	   a	   given	   body	   of	   data”	   (2004,	   p.	   6)	  
[original	  emphasis].	  Various	  types	  of	  logical	  and/or	  mathematical	  manipulations	  can	  be	  recruited	  to	  
modify	  auxiliaries	  or	  hypotheses	  post	  hoc	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  appropriate	  inferential-­‐semantical	  
connection	   to	   the	   evidence.	   One	   well-­‐known	   type	   of	   post	   hoc	   manipulation	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	  
domain	   of	   curve	   fitting.	   To	   account	   for	   a	   wayward	   datum,	   one	   can	   always	   modify	   or	   create	   a	  
polynomial	  which	  includes	  a	  term	  that	  guarantees	  the	  curve	  passes	  through	  or	  sufficiently	  near	  the	  
datum	  in	  addition	  to	  it	  passing	  through	  or	  sufficiently	  near	  existing	  data.	  	  
	  
Because	  accommodation,	  either	  by	  logical	  entailment	  or	  by	  probabilistic	  inference	  of	  an	  appropriate	  
strength,	  can	  be	  obtained	  relatively	  cheaply,	  various	  confirmation	  theorists	  agree	  that	   it	  cannot	  be	  
the	  whole	  story	  about	  confirmation.	  Moreover,	  they	  agree	  that	  a	  big	  part	  of	  the	  story	  concerns	  what	  
a	   theory	  of	   confirmation	  ought	   to	   say	  about	  post	  hocly	   constructed	  or	  modified	  hypotheses.	   	   That	  
this	   is	   not	   a	  mere	   philosophical	   quibble	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   considering	   the	   various	   undesirable	  
hypotheses	  put	  forward	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  post	  hoc	  manipulations,	  e.g.	  Ptolemaic	  astronomy.	  We	  
can	  call	  such	  hypotheses	  ‘post	  hoc	  monsters’.2	  A	  central	  challenge	  facing	  confirmation	  theorists	  then	  
appears	  to	  be	  the	  discovery	  of	  what	  is	  needed	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential-­‐semantical	  
relations	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   a	   complete	   account	   of	   confirmation	   that	   at	   the	   same	   time	   tackles	   the	  
vexing	   issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not,	  and	   if	  so	  to	  what	  extent,	  post	  hoc	  monsters	  can	  be	  confirmed.	  We	  
can	  call	  this	  the	  ‘completion	  challenge’.	  
	  
3.	  Predictivism	  
The	  requirement	  that,	   in	  addition	  to	  standing	   in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	   inferential-­‐semantical	  relations	  to	  
the	  evidence,	  hypotheses	  make	  predictions	  is	  a	  way	  to	  meet	  the	  completion	  challenge,	  either	  in	  part	  
or	  in	  full.	  According	  to	  this	  movement,	  accommodated	  evidence	  and,	  for	  some	  of	  its	  theorists,	  even	  
evidence	  that	  could	  have	  been	  accommodated,	  i.e.	  evidence	  that	  could	  have	  been	  used	  in	  post	  hoc	  
constructions,	   is	   somehow	   inferior	   to	   predicted	   evidence,	   or,	   as	   such	   predictions	   are	   sometimes	  
called,	   ‘novel	  predictions’.	  For	  obvious	  reasons	  this	  movement	  has	  come	  to	  be	  called	   ‘predictivism’	  
and	   it	   is	   contrasted	   to	   the	   ‘accommodationism’	   movement	   which	   denies	   any	   such	   inferiority.	  
Predictivist	   views	   are	   typically	   not	   intended	   as	   complete	   theories	   of	   confirmation	   but	   instead	   as	  
illuminating	   one	   aspect	   of	   it.	  When	   this	   happens	   the	   predictivist	   requirement	   offers	   only	   a	   partial	  
way	   to	   meet	   the	   completion	   challenge.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   that	   there	   are	   weak	   and	   strong	  
versions	  of	  predictivism.	  Let	  us	  call	  a	  predictivism	  ‘weak’	  when	  it	  holds	  that	  predictions,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  mere	  accommodations,	  confer	  greater	  support	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  issue	  them.	  By	  contrast,	  let	  
us	   call	   a	   predictivism	   ‘strong’	   when	   it	   holds	   that	   predictions	   are	   the	   only	   source	   of	   support.3	  
Hereafter,	   I	   will	   express	   the	   fact	   that	   predictivist	   views	   can	   be	   given	   both	   a	   strong	   and	   a	   weak	  
formulation	  by	  presenting	  them	  side	  by	  side,	  with	  the	  weak	  formulation	  appearing	  in	  parentheses.	  	  
	  
Most	  predictivist	   theories	  are	  objective,	   though	  tacitly	  so.	  The	  objective	  character	  of	   the	  two	  most	  
prominent	  kinds	  of	  predictivist	  views,	  i.e.	  temporal	  novelty	  and	  use-­‐novelty,	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  
sections	  that	  follow.	  Before	  we	  continue	  to	  those	  sections,	  it	  is	  worth	  considering,	  if	  only	  briefly,	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  I	  offer	  an	  explication	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘monstrous	  hypotheses’	  in	  Section	  10.	  Until	  then	  the	  readers	  will	  have	  to	  
rely	  on	  the	  examples	  given	  and	  their	  own	  intuitions.	  
3	  William	  Whewell	  (1847)	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  father	  of	  predictivism.	  Hitchcock	  and	  Sober	  (2004,	  §2)	  as	  well	  as	  
Harker	  (2008)	  and	  Barnes	  (2008)	  provide	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  predictivism	  along	  a	  number	  of	  axes.	  My	  use	  of	  the	  
terms	  ‘strong’	  and	  ‘weak’	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  the	  cited	  authors.	  For	  them,	  weak	  predictivism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  
predictions	  have	  a	  special	  confirmational	  role	  only	  because	  they	  indicate	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  other	  epistemic	  
virtue	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  issues	  them,	  e.g.	  simplicity.	  Strong	  predictivism,	  for	  them,	  is	  the	  view	  that	  
predictions	  have	  this	  special	  role	  only	  because	  prediction	  is	  intrinsically	  superior	  to	  accommodation.	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alternative	   kind	   of	   predictivist	   view,	   one	   that	   appears	   to	   be	   subjective.	   I	   have	   here	   in	   mind	   the	  
‘endorsement	  novelty’	  view	  found	  in	  Barnes	  (2008).	  According	  to	  this	  weak	  predictivist	  view,	  “when	  
true	  evidence	  N	  confirms	  T,	  endorsed	  by	  X,	  T	  is	  more	  strongly	  confirmed	  (for	  some	  evaluator)	  when	  
N	   is	   endorsement-­‐novel	   relative	   to	   X	   than	   when	   it	   is	   not”	   (p.	   37).	   Roughly	   speaking,	   a	   piece	   of	  
evidence	  is	  endorsement-­‐novel	  relative	  to	  X	  if	  X	  endorses	  T	  (to	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  so	  as	  to	  not	  arouse	  
scepticism	   about	   her	   commitment)	   without	   recourse	   to	   observations	   relating	   to	   N’s	   truth.	   Given	  
Barnes’	   suggestion	   –	   see	   his	   contribution	   to	   this	   issue	   –	   that	   the	   endorser	   determines	   the	   precise	  
level	  of	  their	  endorsement	  on	  partly	  subjective	  grounds,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  construe	  his	  view	  as	  
a	  subjective	  theory.	  That’s	  about	  as	  much	  as	  I	  will	  say	  about	  this	  view.4	  
	  
4.	  Temporal	  Novelty	  
One	  particular	  brand	  of	  predictivism	  is	  temporal	  novelty.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  support	  emanates	  
solely	   (or	   more	   plentifully)	   from	   phenomena	   that	   become	   known	   after	   the	   hypothesis,	   plus	   any	  
auxiliaries,	   that	  predicts	   them	  was	   formulated	  or	  modified.5	   That	   is,	   it	   emanates	   from	  phenomena	  
that	  are	  temporally	  novel.	  This	  puts	  the	  view	  squarely	  in	  the	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation	  camp,	  
as	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  novel	  depends	  on	  historical	  facts.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  the	  view	  
is	  simple.	  A	  hypothesis,	  plus	  any	  auxiliaries,	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  been	  shaped	  to	  accommodate	  
phenomena	  that	  were	  unknown	  prior	  to	  its	  formulation	  or	  modification.	  This	  obviously	  rules	  out	  the	  
dreaded	  post	  hoc	  manoeuvres.	  
	  
Using	  the	  temporal	  novelty	  account	  we	  can	  now	  make	  quick	  work	  of	  several	  undesirable	  hypotheses.	  
Take	   the	   creationist	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   world	   was	   created	   in	   4004BC.	   Since	   creationism	   (and	   its	  
auxiliaries)	   never	   seems	   to	   predict	   any	   phenomena	   but	  merely	   accommodates	   them,	   it	   does	   not,	  
according	  to	  the	  temporal	  novelty	  account,	  earn	  any	  support	  from	  them.	  The	  theory	  of	  evolution,	  by	  
contrast,	   successfully	   predicts	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   phenomena.	   Among	   other	   things,	   it	   predicts	   the	  
existence	   of	   transitional	   organisms,	   i.e.	   organisms	   that	   exhibit	   features	   of	   both	   older	   and	   newer	  
species.	  Together	  with	  auxiliaries	  concerning	  the	  process	  of	  fossilisation,	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  thus	  
predicts	  the	  existence	  of	  fossilised	  remains	  corresponding	  to	  the	  transitional	  organisms.	  Many	  such	  
fossils	  have	  been	  discovered	  since	   the	   theory	  was	   first	   formulated.	  The	  pertinent	  phenomena	  thus	  
count	   as	   temporally	   novel.	   Beyond	   the	   creationist-­‐evolutionist	   dispute,	   temporal	   novelty	   offers	   a	  
prima	   facie	   plausible	   explanation	   to	   the	   confirmational	   boost	   given	   by	   a	   number	   of	   well-­‐known	  
predictions	   to	   their	   respective	   theories,	   e.g.	   Fresnel’s	   wave	   theory	   of	   light	   and	   the	   Poisson	   spot,	  
Newtonian	   physics	   and	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   planet	   Neptune,	  Mendeleev’s	   periodic	   table	   and	   the	  
discovery	  of	  the	  elements	  gallium,	  germanium	  and	  scandium,	  etc.	  
	  
In	   spite	   of	   some	   advantages,	   the	   account	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	  much	   criticism.6	   One	   objection	  
concerns	  the	  account’s	  reliance	  on	  contingent	  considerations.	  As	  Worrall	  puts	  it:	  
	  
Why	  on	  earth	  should	  the	  apparently	  purely	  contingent	  historical	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  theory	  was	  
first	  developed	  before	  some	  particular	  piece	  of	  evidence	  became	  available	  matter	  at	  all	  in	  an	  account	  
of	  the	  rational	  support	  that	  that	  evidence	  lends	  to	  theory?	  (2002,	  p.	  194)	  [original	  emphasis].7	  
	  
What	   Worrall	   fails	   to	   see	   is	   that,	   presented	   thus,	   the	   objection	   begs	   the	   question	   against	   the	  
temporal	   novelty	   advocates.	   For,	   clearly,	   such	   advocates	   believe	   that	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   contingent	  
consideration	  is	  confirmationally	  relevant.	  Their	  belief	  is	  not	  entirely	  without	  reason.	  Recall	  that	  the	  
rationale	   for	   temporal	   novelty	   is	   that	   phenomena	   that	  were	   unknown	  prior	   to	   the	   formulation	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For	  a	  critique	  see	  Glymour	  (2008).	  
5	  Sometimes	  the	  view	  is	  loosened	  to	  include	  as	  novel	  phenomena	  those	  that	  were	  not	  widely	  known	  to	  the	  
scientific	  community.	  
6	   Temporal	   novelty	   has	   few	   supporters.	   Duhem	   ([1914]	   1991),	   the	   early	   Lakatos	   and	   Maher	   (1988)	   are	  
sometimes	  identified	  as	  supporters,	  though	  not	  without	  controversy.	  
7	  See	  also	  Musgrave	  (1974)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  problems	  afflicting	  the	  temporal	  novelty	  account.	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modification	   of	   a	   hypothesis	   could	   not	   possibly	   have	   been	   used	   to	   post	   hocly	   give	   it	   a	   desirable	  
shape.	  	  
	  
Happily,	  Worrall	  does	  not	  fail	  to	  see	  another,	  this	  time	  genuine,	  objection.	  The	  temporal	  novelty	  view	  
rules	  out	  the	  confirmation	  of	  post	  hoc	  monsters	  but	  in	  so	  doing	  it	  rules	  out	  too	  much.	  Any	  evidence	  
gathered	   before	   the	   postulation	   or	   modification	   of	   a	   hypothesis	   is	   automatically	   dismissed	   as	  
incapable	  of	  providing	   support	   (or	   as	  much	   support)	   to	   that	  hypothesis.	   This	  holds	  even	  when	   the	  
hypothesis	   in	   question	   is,	   by	   anybody’s	   count,	   not	   a	   monster!	   The	   general	   theory	   of	   relativity	   is	  
arguably	  far	  from	  a	  monstrous	  theory.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  in	  its	  favour,	  the	  
precession	   of	  Mercury’s	   perihelion,	  was	   known	   long	   before	   the	   postulation	   of	   the	   theory.	   In	   fact,	  
temporal	  novelty	   ‘goes	  one	  worse’	  as	   it	  promotes	  the	  view	  that	  even	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  already	  
known	   evidence	   had	   not	   actually	   been	   employed	   to	   post	   hocly	   shape	   a	   hypothesis,	   the	   mere	  




At	  least	  some	  data	  that	  were	  known	  prior	  to	  the	  formulation	  or	  modification	  of	  a	  given	  hypothesis,	  it	  
seems,	  must	   be	   capable	   of	   providing	   support	   (or	   as	  much	   support)	   for	   that	   hypothesis.8	  What	  we	  
need	   then	   is	   a	   criterion	   that	   tells	   us	   when	   data	   possess	   this	   ability.	   The	   use	   novelty	   approach	   to	  
predictivism,	  a.k.a.	  the	  ‘heuristic’	  or	  the	  ‘no	  double	  counting’	  approach,	  was	  formulated	  with	  this	  aim	  
in	   mind.	   In	   generic	   terms,	   a	   use	   novelty	   account	   of	   confirmation	   holds	   that	   data	   used	   in	   the	  
construction	  or	  modification	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  cannot	  support	  that	  hypothesis	   (or,	  at	  best,	  support	   it	  
less	   than	   non-­‐use-­‐constructed	   data).	   Loosely	   speaking,	   novelty	   here	   is	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
unexpectedness	  that	  a	  hypothesis	  stands	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  inferential-­‐semantical	  relations	  to	  a	  set	  
of	  data	  that	  was	  not	  used	  in	  its	  construction.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  the	  use	  novelty	  approach	  is	  that	  a	  
hypothesis	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  been	  shaped	  to	  accommodate	  (known	  or	  unknown)	  data	   if	  that	  
data	   were	   not	   used	   in	   its	   construction.	   This	   obviously	   rules	   out	   the	   aforementioned	   post	   hoc	  
manoeuvres.	  
	  
One	  prominent	  case	  of	  use	  novelty	  is	  the	  precession	  of	  Mercury’s	  perihelion	  and	  the	  general	  theory	  
of	  relativity.9	  Several	  other	  cases	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  For	  example,	  Musgrave	  (1974,	  p.	  11)	  
lists	  Galileo’s	  and	  Kepler’s	  laws,	  facts	  about	  tides	  and	  the	  precession	  of	  the	  equinoxes	  in	  relation	  to	  
Newton’s	  theory,	  the	  Michelson-­‐Morley	  experiment	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  special	  theory	  of	  relativity	  and	  
Balmer’s	   empirical	   formulas	   in	   relation	   to	   Bohr’s	   theory	   of	   the	   hydrogen	   atom.	   Since	   phenomena	  
unknown	   prior	   to	   the	   formulation	   or	   modification	   of	   a	   theory	   could	   not	   have	   been	   used	   in	   its	  
construction	  this	  means	  that	  all	  temporally	  novel	  predictions	  are	  also	  use-­‐novel	  ones.	  For	  this	  reason	  
historical	  examples	  of	  temporally	  novel	  predictions	  are	  also	  examples	  of	  use-­‐novel	  predictions.	  
	  
A	   number	   of	   use-­‐novelty	   views	   have	   been	   proposed	   over	   the	   years.	   I	   will	   concentrate	   on	   one	   of	  
them,	  returning	  briefly	  to	  the	  rest	  in	  Section	  8.	  Worrall’s	  view,	  in	  particular	  as	  it	   is	  developed	  in	  his	  
(2002;	  2005;	  2006),	  presents	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  and	  promising	  attempt	  to	  codify	  use-­‐novelty.10	  
His	  strong	  version	  of	  predictivism	  attempts	  to	  tweak	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘novel	  prediction’	  so	  as	  to	  make	  it	  
insensitive	  to	  temporal	  issues.	  To	  achieve	  the	  desired	  insensitivity	  Worrall	  turns	  to	  logic,	  conceiving	  
of	  confirmation	  relations	  in	  deductive	  terms.	  To	  be	  precise,	  he	  applies	  this	  conception	  only	  to	  cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Up	  to	  now,	  I	  have	  used	  the	  concepts	  evidence,	  phenomena	  and	  observations	  interchangeably.	  I'm	  here	  adding	  
the	  concept	  data	  to	  that	  list.	  I	  am	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  controversy	  of	  using	  these	  terms	  interchangeably.	  For	  the	  
sake	  of	  expedience,	  and	  following	  others	  in	  the	  novel	  predictions	  debate,	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  my	  use	  is	  
unproblematic,	  though	  strictly	  speaking	  I	  endorse	  the	  view	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  some	  of	  these	  
concepts,	  e.g.	  between	  phenomena	  and	  data.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  topic	  see	  Votsis	  (2011).	  
9	  This	  example	  is	  not	  uncontroversial.	  Earman	  and	  Glymour	  (1978)	  cite	  two	  letters	  from	  Einstein,	  one	  to	  
Sommerfeld	  and	  one	  to	  Lorentz,	  where	  he	  asserts	  that	  adequately	  accounting	  for	  the	  precession	  of	  Mercury's	  
perihelion	  is	  a	  consideration	  that	  he	  used	  in	  selecting	  between	  different	  versions	  of	  his	  theory.	  
10	  For	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  his	  view	  see	  his	  (1985).	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of	  deterministic	  theories	  in	  science,	  intentionally	  refraining	  from	  telling	  us	  how	  confirmation	  works	  in	  
cases	  of	  indeterministic	  theories.	  At	  least	  part	  of	  his	  reason	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  his	  unhappiness	  with	  the	  
existing	   probabilistic	   theories	   of	   confirmation	   (2006,	   p.	   33).11	   He	   does	   not,	   however,	   indicate	  
whether	  adequate	  probabilistic	  theories	  could	  ever	  be	  formulated.	  
	  
To	  convey	  the	  particulars	  of	  Worrall’s	  view	  requires	  a	  little	  stage-­‐setting.	  Hereafter	  I	  follow	  his	  own	  
conventions.	  T	   stands	   for	  a	  given	  general	   theory,	   theoretical	   framework	  or	  paradigm	  and	  T´	   stands	  
for	  a	  specific	   theory,	   theoretical	   framework	  or	  paradigm	  developed	  out	  of	  T.	  For	  brevity,	   I	  will	   skip	  
reference	   to	   frameworks	   and	   paradigms	   and	   refer	   only	   to	   theories.	   Suppose	   we	   have	   a	   general	  
theory	  T	  with	  one	  or	  more	  free	  parameters,	  a	  specific	  theory	  T´	  developed	  out	  of	  T	  by	  fixing	  the	  free	  
parameters	  and	  a	  datum	  d	  which	  may	  have	  been	  used	  to	  fix	  those	  free	  parameters.	  Suppose	  further	  
that	  T	  does	  not	  entail	  d.	  We	  can	  then	  summarise	  Worrall’s	  view	  in	  the	  following	  two	  principles,	  the	  
first	  corresponding	  to	  support	  for	  specific	  theories	  and	  the	  second	  to	  support	  for	  general	  ones:	  
	  
(S):	  A	  datum	  d	  provides	  confirmational	  support	  for	  T´	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (i)	  d	  is	  entailed	  by	  T´	  and	  either	  (ii)	  
d	   is	  not	  used	  to	  fix	  free	  parameters	  in	  T	  (so	  as	  to	  yield	  T´),	   i.e.	  d	   is	  independent	  of	  any	  data	  used	  in	  
the	   construction	   of	  T´,	   in	  which	   case	   the	   support	   is	   unconditional	  or	   else	   (iii)	  d	   is	   used	   to	   fix	   free	  
parameters	  in	  T	  (so	  as	  to	  yield	  T´)	  in	  which	  case	  the	  support	  is	  conditional	  upon	  accepting	  T.	  
	  
(G):	  A	  datum	  d	  provides	  unconditional	  confirmational	  support	  for	  T	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (a)	  d	  is	  entailed	  by	  T´	  
and	  either	  (b)	  d	  is	  not	  used	  to	  fix	  free	  parameters	  in	  T	  (so	  as	  to	  yield	  T´),	  i.e.	  d	  is	  independent	  of	  any	  
data	  used	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  T´,	  or	  (c)	  d	  falls	  naturally	  out	  of	  T.12	  
	  
Worrall’s	  view	  also	  appears	  to	  qualify	  as	  an	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation	  in	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  
datum	   provides	   (conditional	   or	   unconditional)	   support	   for	   T´	   or	   T	   is	   determined	   not	   by	   personal	  
preferences	   but	   by	   facts	   about	   logic,	   facts	   about	   the	   fixing	   of	   free	   parameters	   and	   facts	   about	   a	  
presumed	  natural	  relation	  between	  d	  and	  T.	  
	  
Let	   us	   get	   a	   bit	  more	   grip	   on	   these	   principles,	   starting	  with	   (S).	   The	   first	   two	   conditions	   are	   fairly	  
straightforward.	  Condition	  (i)	  expresses	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  logical	  entailment	  of	  data	  by	  a	  hypothesis	  is	  
necessary	   for	   support.	   This	   idea	  makes	   sense	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Worrall’s	   theory	   as	   he	   restricts	   his	  
attention	   to	   non-­‐probabilistic	   cases.13	  Condition	   (ii)	   expresses	   the	   central	   idea	   behind	   use-­‐novelty.	  
Condition	   (iii)	   appears	   at	   first	   sight	   counterintuitive	   as	   it	   says	   something	   that	  one	  wouldn’t	   expect	  
from	   a	   use-­‐novelty	   account.	   How	   could	   data	   used	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   (specific)	   theory	   also	  
support	  it?	  The	  trick	  is	  that	  the	  support	  provided	  is	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  than	  that	  referred	  to	  in	  (ii).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Worrall	  seems	  to	  make	  two	  false	  assumptions	  here:	  (i)	  that	  indeterministic	  hypotheses	  cannot	  stand	  in	  any	  
deductive	  relations	  to	  data	  and	  (ii)	  that	  deterministic	  hypotheses	  cannot	  stand	  in	  any	  inductive	  relations	  to	  
data.	  All	  that	  he	  should	  be	  saying	  is	  that	  his	  theory	  only	  focuses	  on	  cases	  where	  a	  datum	  d	  (or	  not-­‐d)	  is	  
deductively	  entailed	  by	  a	  hypothesis.	  
12	  For	  an	  informal	  exposition	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  theories	  earn	  confirmation	  see	  Worrall	  (2002,	  pp.	  
203-­‐204;	  2005,	  pp.	  817-­‐818;	  2006,	  pp.	  50-­‐51).	  For	  a	  principled	  exposition	  see	  his	  (2006,	  p.	  56).	  The	  latter	  (but	  
not	  the	  former)	  weirdly	  neglects	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  general	  theories	  earn,	  according	  to	  him,	  so-­‐called	  
‘spill-­‐over’	  support	  –	  those	  are	  listed	  as	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  in	  my	  principled	  exposition.	  Note	  also	  two	  further	  
differences	  between	  my	  own	  and	  Worrall’s	  principled	  exposition.	  First,	  his	  two	  principles	  concern	  conditional	  
and	  unconditional	  support	  respectively,	  whereas	  mine	  carve	  up	  confirmation	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  specific	  and	  
general	  theories.	  Second,	  his	  two	  principles	  are	  formulated	  as	  material	  conditionals,	  mine	  as	  material	  bi-­‐
conditionals.	  Given	  that	  Worrall	  restricts	  his	  notions	  of	  confirmation	  to	  non-­‐probabilistic	  cases,	  the	  other	  
direction	  of	  the	  material	  implication	  also	  holds.	  That	  he	  approves	  my	  bi-­‐conditional	  formulation	  has	  been	  
established	  in	  e-­‐mail	  correspondence	  I	  had	  with	  him.	  
13	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  some	  (non-­‐trivial)	  consequences	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  do	  not	  provide	  confirmational	  support	  to	  it	  
then	  conditions	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  are	  obviously	  insufficient.	  Also	  if	  support	  can	  come	  from	  non-­‐consequences	  then	  
condition	  (i)	  is	  not	  necessary.	  See	  Laudan	  and	  Leplin	  (1991)	  for	  arguments	  supporting	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  both	  
antecedents.	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  first	  antecedent	  in	  Section	  9.	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Given	  that	  a	  general	  framework,	  or	  research	  programme,	  is	  already	  accepted,	  then	  the	  data	  give	  –	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   a	   genuine	   deduction	   –	   not	   just	   some	   support	   for	   the	   specific	   theory,	   but	   conclusive	  
support	  (2002,	  pp.	  201-­‐203)	  [original	  emphasis]	  –	  see	  also	  (2006,	  p.	  51).	  
	  
The	   key	   to	   understanding	   condition	   (iii)	   is	   deductivism	   concerning	   evidential	   relations.	   There’s	   no	  
better	  way	  to	  transmit	  evidential	  warrant	  than	  by	  a	  deductively	  valid	  argument,	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  
premises	  guarantees	   the	   truth	  of	   the	  conclusion	   (2006,	  p.	  43).	  Thus,	  provided	  we	  have	  grounds	   to	  
believe	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  premises,	  which	  in	  the	  cases	  discussed	  by	  Worrall	  include	  T	  and	  d,	  we	  have	  
grounds	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  conclusion,	  i.e.	  T´.	  Since	  this	  support	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  truth	  
of	  the	  premises	  it	  is	  obviously	  conditional	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  T.	  
	  
Despite	   calling	   it	   ‘conclusive’,	   Worrall	   ultimately	   downplays	   conditional	   support	   and	   claims	   that	  
“[r]eal	   support	   for	   T´	   must	   be	   sought	   through	   independent	   evidence”	   (2002,	   p.	   195)	   [original	  
emphasis].	   This	   is	   unsurprising	   given	   that,	   by	   the	   lights	   of	   his	   own	   theory,	   post	   hoc	   manoeuvres	  
(which	   he	   construes	   as	   cases	   of	   parameter	   fixing)	   meet	   the	   requirements	   of	   conditional	   support.	  
Worrall	  cites	  Velikovsky’s	  theory	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  In	  its	  general	  form	  the	  theory	  holds,	  among	  other	  
things,	  that	  Venus	  was	  once	  a	  comet	  that	  broke	  off	  from	  Jupiter	  and	  eventually	  settled	  in	  its	  current	  
orbit	   as	   the	   second	   planet	   from	   the	   sun.	   Velikovsky	   professed	   that	   this	   theory	   (plus	   auxiliaries)	  
explains	  alleged	  cataclysmic	  phenomena	  of	  the	  past,	  e.g.	  the	  parting	  of	  the	  Red	  Sea,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
proximity	  of	  the	  comet’s	  orbit	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Earth’s.	  Now	  if	  the	  general	  theory	  is	  correct,	  cataclysmic	  
events	   must	   have	   taken	   place	   throughout	   the	   world	   during	   those	   close	   encounters.	   Velikovsky	  
attempted	  to	  find	  records	  of	  such	  cataclysms	  but	  came	  up	  short.	  To	  compensate	  for	  this	   failure	  he	  
postulated	   that	  events	   like	   these	  were	  so	   traumatic	   that	  many	  cultures	  did	  not	   record	   them.	   In	   its	  
specific	   form	  Velikovsky's	   theory	  thus	  says,	  among	  other	   things,	   that	  cataclysmic	  events	   took	  place	  
because	   of	   the	   comet’s	   close	   encounters	   with	   our	   planet	   and	   even	   though	   all	   cultures	   witnessed	  
these	  events,	  those	  that	  didn’t	  record	  them	  were	  too	  traumatised.	  Worrall	  judges	  that	  this	  theory	  is	  
supported	   by	   the	   cataclysmic	   record	   evidence	   conditional	   on	   our	   accepting	   the	   general	   version	   of	  
Velikovsky’s	  theory.	  Indeed,	  Worrall	  would	  add	  that	  unconditional	  confirmation	  is	  missing	  in	  this	  case	  
since	  Velikovsky’s	  specific	  theory	  never	  enjoyed	  any	  independent	  support.	  
	  
Moving	   on	   to	   (G),	   we	   can	   skip	   discussion	   of	   condition	   (a)	   since	   it	   has	   the	   same	   motivation	   as	  
condition	   (i)	   in	  principle	   (S)	  and	   instead	   focus	  on	   the	  other	   two	  conditions,	   i.e.	   (b)	  and	   (c).	  Each	  of	  
these	  conditions	  represents	  a	  different	  type	  of	  unconditional	  spill-­‐over	  support	  that	  a	  general	  theory	  
may	  earn.	  Take	  condition	  (b)	  first.	  Worrall	  cites	  the	  specific	  version	  of	  Fresnel’s	  wave	  theory	  of	  light	  
as	  a	   successful	  example	  of	   the	   first	   type	  of	   spill-­‐over	   support.	  The	  general	  wave	   theory	  posits	   that	  
light	  consists	  of	  waves	  that	  are	  transmitted	  through	  an	  all-­‐pervading	  mechanical	  medium,	  the	  ether.	  
Waves	  from	  different	  sources	  have	  different	  wavelengths.	  The	  exact	  wavelength	  of	  a	  given	  source	  is	  
not	  determined	  by	   the	  general	   theory	   itself	  but	  by	  performing	  experiments.	   For	  example,	  one	   can	  
perform	   a	   two-­‐slit	   experiment	   with	   a	   sodium	   arc	   as	   the	   light	   source	   and	   measure	   the	   distance	  
between	   fringes	   in	   the	   observed	   diffraction	   pattern.	   Since	   the	   general	   theory	   posits	   a	   bijective	  
mapping	   between	   fringe	   distance	   and	  wavelength,	   the	  wavelength	   of	   sodium	   can	   be	   determined.	  
This	  allows	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  specific	  version	  of	  the	  wave	  theory,	  one	  that	  focuses	  on	  light	  from	  a	  
sodium	   source.	   The	   specific	   theory	   can	   then	   be	   employed	   to	   successfully	   predict	   independent	  
phenomena.	   In	   the	   case	   at	   hand,	   for	   example,	   it	   can	   predict	   fringe	   separations	   in	   the	   one-­‐slit	  
diffraction	  experiment	  with	  light	  coming	  from	  a	  sodium	  source	  (2006,	  p.	  47).	  
	  
Now	  take	  condition	   (c).	  Although	  Worrall	   sometimes	   talks	  of	  phenomena	  “fall[ing]	  naturally	  out	  of	  
the	  core	  idea”,	  of	  what	  we	  might	  presume	  is	  the	  core	  idea	  of	  a	  general	  theory,	  what	  he	  really	  means	  
is	  that	  such	  phenomena	  fall	  naturally	  out	  of	  the	  general	  theory	  plus	  one	  or	  more	  auxiliaries	  (2002,	  p.	  
203).	  Indeed,	  most	  references	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  naturalness	  are	  in	  terms	  of	  natural	  auxiliaries.	  What	  
are	  the	  identifying	  marks	  of	  natural	  auxiliaries?	  Alas,	  Worrall	  says	  very	  little	  about	  them.	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  
jump	   straight	   to	   an	   example.	  Worrall	   (2005,	   p.	   818;	   2006,	   pp.	   48-­‐49)	   cites	   planetary	   stations	   and	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retrogressions	   as	   falling	   naturally	   out	   of	   Copernicus’	   general	   heliocentric	   theory	   plus	   certain	  
auxiliaries.	   ‘Stations’	   refer	   to	   the	   apparent	   stops	   that	   planets	   come	   to	   in	   their	   journey	   across	   the	  
night	   sky	   while	   ‘retrogressions’	   refer	   to	   their	   apparent	   backward	   motion.	   The	   pertinent	   natural	  
auxiliary	   is	   roughly	   the	   following:	   To	   an	   observer	   on	   Earth	   viewing	   the	  motion	   of	   a	   planet	   (Mars,	  
Jupiter,	  Saturn	  and	  Uranus)	  against	  the	  largely	  stationary	  background	  of	  the	  stars,	  the	  planet	  appears	  
to	  slow	  down	  and	  even	  stop	  (station)	  before	  turning	  backwards	  (retrogression)	  when	  the	  Earth	  in	  its	  
smaller	   orbit	   around	   the	   Sun	   overtakes	   that	   planet.	   Although	   Worrall	   does	   not	   explain	   why	   an	  
auxiliary	  like	  this	  is	  natural	  for	  Copernicus’	  general	  heliocentric	  theory,	  we	  can	  provide	  the	  following	  
motivation:	   Because	   objects	   on	   Earth	   traversing	   elliptical	   paths	   of	   different	   radii	   around	   the	   same	  
two	   foci	   yield	   the	   same	   station	  and	   retrogression	  phenomena	  as	   their	   cousins	   in	   space,	  no	   special	  
manoeuvres	  are	  required	  in	  marrying	  Copernicus’	  theory	  with	  the	  said	  auxiliary.	  
	  
Before	   we	   proceed	   to	   a	   critical	   evaluation	   of	   Worrall’s	   view,	   we	   must	   dismiss	   a	   common	  
misconception	  about	   it.	   Fitting	  data	   to	   theories	   is	   a	  widespread	  and	   respected	  practice	   in	   science.	  
But	  fitting	  data	   is	  nothing	  other	  than	  using	   it	  to	  post	  hocly	  construct	  or	  modify	  theories	  or	  models.	  
Sober	  and	  Hitchcock	  (2004)	  are	  keen	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “[a]ccommodation	  is	  not	  always	  bad”,	  and	  in	  
fact	  that	  “[f]it	  with	  existing	  data	  is	  a	  good	  thing”	  (p.	  6)	  [original	  emphasis].	  In	  their	  view	  the	  only	  time	  
that	  accommodation	  goes	  astray	   is	  when	   the	  methods	  employed	   to	  accommodate	   the	  data	   fail	   to	  
guard	  against	  over-­‐fitting.	  Similarly,	  Lange	  (2001)	  argues	  that	  accommodation	  is	  typically	  bad	  when	  
the	   resulting	   hypotheses	   are	   in	   fact	   coincidental	   truths	   or	   arbitrary	   conjunctions.	   Given	   what	   has	  
already	  been	  said,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  assume	  that	  Worrall	  is	  squarely	  against	  the	  practice	  of	  data	  fitting	  
or	  accommodation.	  That	  couldn’t	  be	  further	  from	  the	  truth.	  What	  Worrall	  (2002,	  p.	  198)	  objects	  to	  is	  
the	  attribution	  of	  confirmational	  weight	  to	  data	  that	  has	  already	  been	  used	  to	  construct	  or	  modify	  a	  
theory.	  That	  is,	  he	  endorses	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘no	  double	  counting’	  rule,	  i.e.	  the	  rule	  that	  once	  
a	   datum	   has	   been	   used	   to	   construct	   a	   theory,	   it	   cannot	   also	   be	   used	   to	   confirm	   that	   theory.	   In	  
Worrall’s	   variant	   (2006,	  p.	  57)	   such	  a	  datum	  confirms	  a	   specific	   theory	  but	   in	  a	   conditional	  way,	   a	  
kind	  of	  confirmation	  that,	  as	  we	  saw,	  he	  does	  not	  consider	  real.	  
	  
6.	  The	  Complete	  Data	  Set	  Counterexample	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  an	  important	  counter-­‐example	  to	  Worrall’s	  theory	  and	  
use-­‐novelty	   more	   generally.	   Mayo	   (1996,	   p.	   271)	   asks	   us	   to	   imagine	   a	   logic	   class	   which	   contains	  
students	  who	  took	  the	  SAT	  examination.	  Suppose	  we	  want	  to	  find	  out	  the	  average	  SAT	  score	  of	  those	  
students.	  Suppose	  further	  that	  we	  have	  access	  to	  all	  the	  scores.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  matter	  
is	  to	  add	  up	  all	   the	   individual	  scores	  and	  divide	  the	  resulting	  number	  by	  the	  number	  of	  students	   in	  
the	   class.	   The	   result,	   suppose	   it	   is	   1121,	   would	   then	   allow	   us	   to	   formulate	   the	   following	   true	  
hypothesis:	  The	  average	  SAT	  score	  of	   this	   logic	  class	   is	  1121.	  Surely,	  Mayo	  concludes,	   the	  data,	   i.e.	  
the	   individual	   scores,	   support	   the	   hypothesis	   in	   question	   even	   though	   they	   have	   been	   used	   to	  
construct	  it.	  In	  reply,	  Worrall	  complains	  that	  Mayo’s	  objection	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  genuine	  confirmation.	  
In	   more	   detail,	   he	   first	   complains	   that	   the	   assertion	   is	   not	   a	   genuine	   hypothesis	   because	   “the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  scores	  and	  the	  average	  score	  is	  analytic”.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  
genuine	  hypotheses	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  such	  a	  relationship	  to	  the	  data	  (2006,	  p.	  59).	  He	  then	  complains	  
that	   “a	   test	  of	   a	   theory	   surely	  must	  have	  a	  possible	  outcome	   that	   is	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   theory”	  
(2006,	   p.	   58).	   This	   is	   presumably	   absent	   in	   the	   SAT	   score	   case	   since	   nothing	   in	   the	   relevant	  
construction	  process	  “could	  possibly	  refute	  the	  ‘theory’	  that	  we	  end	  up	  with”	  (p.	  58).	  
	  
Both	  replies	  are	  unwarranted.	  Take	  the	  first.	  The	  relationship	  between	  any	  true	  hypothesis	  and	  the	  
set	  containing	  all	  and	  only	   its	  consequences	   is	  bound	  to	  be	  analytic.	  After	  all,	   the	  two	  have	  exactly	  
the	  same	  content.	  So	  a	  non-­‐analytic	  relationship	  cannot	  be	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  genuine	  hypothesis.	  Now	  
take	   the	   second.	   Does	   the	   SAT	   score	   data	   support	   the	   SAT	   score	   hypothesis?	   To	   see	   why	   this	  
question	  must	  be	  answered	  affirmatively,	  consider	  the	  following	  twist	  to	  the	  example.	  Suppose	  that	  
the	   same	  hypothesis	  were	  posited	  without	   recourse	   to	   the	  data,	  e.g.	   via	   some	   informed	   judgment	  
about	   how	   students	   in	   logic	   classes	   typically	   perform	   in	   such	   tests.	   How	   would	   we	   go	   about	  
supporting	   or	   refuting	   it?	   Well,	   obviously,	   by	   finding	   out	   all	   the	   individual	   scores	   and	   correctly	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calculating	  their	  average.	  And	  since	  that	  calculation	  is	  in	  perfect	  agreement	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  we	  
must	   concede	   that	   the	   data	   (fully)	   supports	   it.	   Moreover,	   if,	   as	   will	   be	   argued	   in	   the	   Section	   9,	  
support	   is	  an	   invariant	   relation	   that	  holds	  only	  between	  a	  data	  set	  and	  a	  hypothesis,	   then	   the	  SAT	  
score	  data	  (fully)	  supports	  the	  SAT	  score	  hypothesis	  even	  in	  Mayo’s	  original	  example,	  i.e.	  where	  the	  
data	  were	   used	   to	   construct	   the	   hypothesis.	   The	   point	   generalises	   to	   any	   true	   hypothesis	   and	   its	  
corresponding	   complete	   data	   set.	   There	   is	   thus	   nothing	   improper	   about	   claiming	   that	   a	   complete	  
data	   set	   supports	   a	   true	   hypothesis	   and	   thus	   nothing	   improper	   about	  Mayo’s	   counter-­‐example	   to	  
Worrall’s	  theory.	  
	  
7.	  Contingency	  and	  Conflicting	  Confirmational	  Assessments	  
Unlike	   Zahar	   (1973),	  Worrall	   does	  not	  urge	  us	   to	  peer	   into	   the	  notebooks	  of	   scientists	   in	   order	   to	  
assess	  whether	  data	  has	  been	  used	  to	  construct	  a	  theory	  or	  auxiliary.	  He	  is	  wholeheartedly	  bent	  on	  
eliminating	  psychologically	  contingent	  considerations	  from	  his	  account:	  “My	  account	  gives	  no	  role	  to	  
any	   such	   psychological	   factor”	   (2005,	   p.	   819).	   And	   it	   is	   not	   only	   psychological	   factors	   that	   he	  
dismisses.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   Section	   4,	   he	   laughs	   off	   the	   idea	   that	   any	   “contingent	   historical	   issue”	  
whatsoever	   should	   have	   an	   effect	   on	   confirmation	   (2002,	   p.	   194).	   That	   Worrall	   sees	   his	   own	  
confirmation	  theory	  as	  steering	  well	  clear	  of	  this	  idea	  is	  reinforced	  a	  few	  years	  later:	  “When	  properly	  
understood,	  however,	  the	  ‘heuristic’	  view	  I	  advocate	  does	  not	  have	  this	  historical	  character”	  (2006,	  
pp.	  55-­‐56).	  But	   then	  how	   is	  confirmation	  to	  be	  decided	  according	  to	  him?	  The	  answer	   is	  on	  purely	  
logical	  grounds.	  Referring	  to	  his	  theory,	  he	  says:	  
	  
Although	   presented	   as	   a	   version	   of	   the	   ‘heuristic	   approach’,	   it	   is	   at	   root	   a	   logical	   theory	   of	  
confirmation	   -­‐	   the	   important	   logical	   relations	   being	   between	   (i)	   the	   evidence	   at	   issue	   e,	   (ii)	   the	  
general	   theoretical	   framework	   involved	   T	   and	   (iii)	   the	   specific	   theory	   T’	   (2005,	   p.	   819)	   [original	  
emphasis].	  
	  
A	   few	  pages	   later	   he	   reiterates	   this	   point:	   “it	   is	   the	   sort	   of	   logical	   connections	   between	   evidence,	  
general	  and	  specific	  theories	  highlighted	  in	  my	  approach	  that	  really	  do	  the	  work”	  (2005	  p.	  823).	  And	  
again	   in	   another	   publication:	   “The	   main	   conclusion	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   that	   there	   are	   two	   types	   of	  
confirmation	  [conditional	  and	  unconditional]	  —both	  of	  them	  (three-­‐place)	  ‘logical’.”	  (2006,	  p.	  56).	  
	  
In	   spite	   of	   Worrall’s	   best	   efforts,	   contingent	   considerations	   are	   still	   permitted	   to	   play	   a	  
confirmational	  role	  in	  his	  account.	  Suppose	  a	  data	  set	  O	   is	  entailed	  by	  a	  specific	  theory	  T´.	  Suppose	  
further	   that	  O	   =	  O1	  ∪	  O2	   but	   also	   that	  O1	  ∩	  O2	   =	  ∅.	   Suppose	  moreover	   that	  O1	   and	  O2	  possess	   a	  
number	  of	  qualities	  we	  admire	   in	  data	  sets,	  e.g.	  diversity,	  accuracy,	   informativeness,	  etc.,	  and	  that	  
they	  possess	   these	  qualities	   in	  equal	  measure,	   i.e.	   they	  are	   indistinguishable	  with	   respect	   to	   these	  
qualities.14	  Finally,	  suppose	  that	  T´	  can	  be	  constructed	  from	  either	  O1	  or	  O2	  by	  fixing	  exactly	  the	  same	  
free	   parameter(s).	   If	   T´	   is	   constructed	   from	   O1	   and	   T´	   is	   utilised	   to	   predict	   O2,	   then	   T´	   gets	  
unconditional	  support	  only	  from	  O2.	  If,	  however,	  T´	  is	  constructed	  from	  O2	  and	  T´	  is	  utilised	  to	  predict	  
O1,	  then	  T´	  gets	  unconditional	  support	  only	  from	  O1.	  Worrall’s	  account	  commits	  a	  double	  crime	  here.	  
It	   issues	   conflicting	   confirmational	   judgments.	   And,	   contrary	   to	   its	   own	   pronouncements,	   its	  
judgments	  depend	  on	  contingent	   considerations.	  Crucially,	  neither	   set	   can	  be	  dismissed	  as	   inferior	  
and	  therefore	  as	  less	  deserving	  to	  provide	  unconditional	  support	  since,	  by	  supposition,	  O1	  and	  O2	  are	  
qualitatively	   on	   par.	   And	   crucially,	   nothing	   in	   Worrall’s	   allegedly	   pure	   logical	   account	   forbids	   the	  
existence	  of	  disjoint	  data	   sets	   like	  O1	   and	  O2	   that	  are	   individually	   sufficient	   to	   fix	  exactly	   the	   same	  
free	  parameter(s)	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  T´.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Referee	  1	  objected	  that	  we	  do	  not	  find	  data	  sets	  that	  are	  qualitatively	  indistinguishable	  in	  actual	  cases	  of	  
science	  and,	  as	  such,	  the	  challenge	  my	  example	  poses	  amounts	  to	  general	  scepticism.	  Firstly,	  it	  must	  be	  
pointed	  out	  that	  most	  confirmation	  theorists,	  and	  potentially	  also	  Worrall,	  aim	  to	  capture	  not	  only	  actual	  cases	  
from	  the	  history	  of	  science	  but	  also	  hypothetical	  ones.	  Secondly,	  all	  it	  takes	  is	  one	  case	  of	  qualitative	  
indistinguishability	  for	  Worrall’s	  account	  to	  fail.	  Thirdly,	  actual	  science	  is	  littered	  with	  such	  cases.	  Just	  think	  of	  
two	  sets	  of	  data	  gathered	  using	  the	  same	  instrument	  but	  each	  recording	  a	  distinct	  orbit	  of	  a	  planet	  around	  its	  
parent	  star.	  The	  two	  sets	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  qualitatively	  indistinguishable.	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Worrall	  (2006,	  pp.	  51-­‐56),	  inspired	  by	  Musgrave	  (1974,	  pp.	  13-­‐14),	  considers	  a	  family	  of	  objections	  to	  
his	   view	   that	   are	   almost	   identical	   to	   the	   objection	   just	   advanced.	   The	   starting	   point	   for	   all	   these	  
objections	  is	  two	  scientists	  A	  and	  B	  who	  each	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  specific	  theory	  via	  different	  routes.	  
Three	  such	  route-­‐variations	  are	  considered.	  We	  only	  need	  entertain	  one	  here,	   the	  one	  that’s	  most	  
similar	  to	  the	  above	  objection.	  Suppose	  scientist	  A	  produces	  T´	  from	  some	  evidence	  e1	  and	  then	  goes	  
on	  to	  predict	  e2	  from	  it,	  whereas	  scientist	  B	  does	  the	  reverse.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  from	  scientist	  A’s	  
perspective	  e1	  provides	  conditional	  support	  for	  T´	  and	  e2	  unconditional	  support	  for	  T´	  and	  T,	  but	  from	  
scientist	  B’s	  perspective	  the	  opposite	  is	  true.	  Worrall’s	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  that	  even	  though	  the	  
two	  judgments	  are	  “strictly	  different”	  they	  are	  equivalent	  in	  what	  matters.	  In	  his	  own	  words:	  	  
	  
each	  of	  A	  and	  B	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  general	  theory	  needs	  to	  fill	  in	  one	  parameter	  value	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
one	   piece	   of	   data,	   thus	   producing	   a	   specific	   theory	   that	   gains	   genuine	   empirical	   success	   from	   the	  
other	   piece	   of	   data...	   So	   each	   scientist	   shows	   that	   there	   is,	   so	   to	   speak,	   one	   unit	   of	   genuine,	  
unconditional,	   general-­‐theory-­‐involving	   data	   and	   hence	   delivers	   the	   judgment	   that	   that	   general	  
theory	  is	  ahead	  in	  terms	  of	  empirical	  support	  of	  any	  theory	  that	  merely	  accommodates	  both	  pieces	  of	  
data	  (p.	  55).	  
	  
This	   reply	   is	   tantamount	   to	   burying	   one’s	   head	   in	   the	   sand	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	   Worrall’s	  
account,	  as	   it	   is	  encoded	  in	  principles	  (S)	  and	  (G),	  still	   issues	  conflicting	  confirmational	  assessments	  
regarding	   e1	   and	   e2.15	   That’s	   surely	   an	   undesirable	   feature	   for	   a	   confirmational	   theory	   to	   possess.	  
Worrall	  seems	  to	  unwittingly	  subscribe	  to	  the	  undesirability	  of	  this	  feature,	   in	  the	  process	  shooting	  
himself	  in	  the	  foot,	  when	  he	  asserts:	  “It	  is	  clearly	  a	  desideratum	  on	  any	  account	  of	  confirmation	  that	  
it	   underwrite	   the	   judgement	   ‘same	   evidence,	   same	   theory,	   same	   confirmation’	   and	   my	   account	  
underwrites	  exactly	  this	  judgment”	  (p.	  55).	  In	  the	  above	  two	  examples	  the	  same	  evidence	  does	  not	  
provide	  the	  same	  theory	  with	  the	  same	  confirmation.	  
	  
8.	  A	  Pandemic	  for	  Incidental	  Predictivists	  
Worrall’s	  view	  is	  the	  only	  brand	  of	  predictivism	  that	  attempts,	  and	  as	   I	   just	  argued	  fails,	  to	  exclude	  
contingent	  considerations	  from	  confirmational	  matters.	  All	  other	  brands	  of	  predictivism	  deliberately	  
include	  such	  considerations	  in	  their	  calculations.	  Let	  us	  call	  these	  predictivist	  views	  ‘incidental’.	  As	  we	  
saw	  earlier,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  contingent	  considerations	  is	  not	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  objectionable,	  for	  such	  an	  
objection	  would	   beg	   the	   question	   against	   incidental	   predictivists.	   Even	   so,	   I	  will	   now	  demonstrate	  
that,	   much	   like	   Pandora’s	   box,	   contingent	   considerations	   appear	   innocuous	   on	   the	   outside	   but	  
conceal	   a	   terrible	   pestilence	  within.	   Indeed,	   if	   I	   am	   right,	   this	   is	   a	   pestilence	   that	   takes	   pandemic	  
proportions	  with	  no	  incidental	  predictivism,	  at	  least	  not	  one	  found	  in	  the	  literature,	  left	  standing.	  
	  
Incidental	  predictivism	  comes	   in	  various	   forms.	  What	  they	  all	  have	   in	  common	   is	   the	   inclusion	  of	  a	  
condition	  whose	   satisfaction	  depends	  on	   specific	   contingent	   considerations,	   that	   is,	   considerations	  
like	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  datum	  was	  known	  at	  the	  time	  a	  theory	  was	  formulated.	  Let	  us	  denote	  any	  such	  
contingent	   condition	   with	   the	   letter	   ‘X’.	   Beyond	   this	   condition,	   incidental	   predictivists,	   like	   non-­‐
incidental	   ones	   and	   confirmation	   theorists	  more	   generally,	   require	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   two	   further	  
conditions.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  condition	  whose	  satisfaction	  depends	  on	  specific	  inferential	  considerations,	  
i.e.	  considerations	  like	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  datum	  is	  logically	  entailed	  by	  a	  hypothesis.	  Let	  us	  denote	  any	  
such	  inferential	  condition	  with	  the	  letter	  ‘Y’.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  condition	  whose	  satisfaction	  depends	  on	  
specific	   semantic	   considerations,	   i.e.	   considerations	   like	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   datum	   is	   true.	   Let	   us	  
denote	  any	  such	  semantic	  condition	  with	  the	  letter	  ‘Z’.	  A	  version	  of	  incidental	  predictivism	  then	  holds	  
that	  a	  hypothesis	   is	  supported	  (or	  more	  supported)	  by	  a	  set	  of	  data	   if	   (and	  perhaps	  also	  only	   if)	   its	  
specific	  construals	  of	  conditions	  X,	  Y	  and	  Z	  are	  satisfied.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Worrall	  may	  attempt	  to	  modify	  these	  principles	  accordingly	  but	  until	  he	  does	  we	  cannot	  begin	  to	  evaluate	  
them.	  Note	   that	  whatever	   form	   such	  modification	   takes	  Worrall	  will	   have	   to	   ensure	   that	   his	   notion	   of	   ‘use’	  
does	  not	  allow	  contingent	  considerations	  to	  come	  into	  play,	  otherwise	  the	  same	  problems	  will	  surface.	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Now	  consider	  the	  following	  variant	  of	  the	  two-­‐set	  counterexample.	  First,	  suppose	  that	  disjoint	  data	  
sets	  O1	  and	  O2	  each	  satisfy	  condition	  Ys	  by	  standing	  in	  certain	  inferential	  relations	  to	  a	  hypothesis	  H.	  
Second,	  suppose	  that	  each	  data	  set	  possesses	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  semantic	  qualities	  that	  amount	  to	  
the	  satisfaction	  of	  condition	  Zs.	  To	  simplify	  things,	  take	  the	  inferential	  relation	  to	  be	  entailment	  and	  
the	   semantic	   quality	   to	   be	   truth	   since	   both	   are	   always	   included	   as	   limit	   cases	   in	   their	   respective	  
conditions.	  Third,	   suppose	   that	  condition	  Xs	   can	  be	  satisfied	  by	  both	  sets.	  Fourth,	   suppose	   that	  we	  
have	   two	  scientists,	  F	  and	  G,	  each	  of	  whom	  belongs	   to	  a	  distinct	   isolated	  scientific	  community	  but	  
both	  of	  whom	  support	  the	  specific	  form	  of	  incidental	  predictivism	  that	  emerges	  out	  of	  conditions	  Xs,	  
Ys	   and	   Zs.	   Finally,	   suppose	   that	   for	   scientist	   F	   condition	  Xs	   is	   satisfied	   by	  O1	   but	   not	   by	  O2	   but	   for	  
scientist	  G	  condition	  Xs	  is	  satisfied	  by	  O2	  but	  not	  by	  O1.	  F	  endorses	  the	  claim:	  
	  
(C1):	  O1	  supports	  hypothesis	  H	  but	  not	  O2	  (or	  O1	  supports	  hypothesis	  H	  more	  than	  O2).	  
	  
Whereas	  G	  endorses	  the	  claim:	  
	  
(C2):	  O2	  supports	  hypothesis	  H	  but	  not	  O1	  (or	  O2	  supports	  hypothesis	  H	  more	  than	  O1).	  	  
	  
The	  two	  claims	  are	  clearly	  inconsistent.	  The	  inconsistency	  arises	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  condition	  
Xs	   can	  be	   satisfied	  by	  either	   set.	  And	   since	   condition	  X	   (but	   also	  Y	   and	  Z)	   can	   take	   any	  number	  of	  
forms	   this	  makes	   the	   issuing	   of	   conflicting	   confirmational	   judgments	   a	   highly	   prevalent	   feature	   of	  
incidental	  predictivism.	  	  
	  
Why	  highly	  prevalent	  but	  not	  universal?	  Because	  there	  is	  one	  kind	  of	  form	  condition	  X	  can	  take,	  as	  
far	  as	  I	  can	  see	  one	  of	  only	  two	  (see	  Footnote	  16	  for	  the	  other),	  which	  saves	  incidental	  predictivism	  
from	  the	  above	  objection.	  The	  kind	  of	  form	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  requires	  condition	  X	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
historical	  details	  from	  all	  scientists	  in	  the	  universe	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  above	  circumstances.	  
Alas	   for	   incidental	   predictivism,	   this	   move	   exchanges	   one	   damning	   objection	   for	   another.	  
Confirmational	   assessments	  now	  become	   impossible	   in	  practice	   since	  we	  do	  not	  have,	   and	   cannot	  
realistically	  be	  expected	  to	  have,	  epistemic	  access	  to	  the	  history	  of	  all	  such	  scientists	  in	  the	  universe.	  
Take	  Zahar’s	  (1973)	  version	  of	  predictivism	  as	  an	  example.	  According	  to	  his	  conception	  of	  condition	  
X,	  if	  a	  datum	  is	  to	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis	  it	  must	  not	  have	  been	  explanatorily	  targeted	  by	  the	  scientist	  
who	   constructs	   that	   hypothesis.	   As	   it	   stands,	   his	   view	   falls	   prey	   to	   the	   objection	   in	   the	   previous	  
paragraph	  –	  see	  Musgrave	   (1974,	  pp.	  13-­‐14)	   for	  a	   similar	  objection.	  To	  avoid	   that	  objection,	  Zahar	  
may	  modify	  his	  version	  of	  condition	  X	  as	   follows:	   if	  a	  datum	   is	   to	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis	   it	  must	  not	  
have	  been	  explanatorily	  targeted	  by	  any	  scientist	  in	  the	  universe	  who	  constructs	  that	  hypothesis.	  It	  
should	  be	  obvious	  that	  checking	  whether	  this	  condition	  is	  ever	  met	  is	  in	  practice	  impossible.	  
	  
All	  existing	  versions	  of	  incidental	  predictivism	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  first	  (or,	  if	  modified	  to	  avoid	  it,	  the	  
second)	   objection	   regardless	   of	   the	   form	   their	   condition	   X	   takes.	   Aside	   from	   Zahar’s	   version	   of	  
condition,	  this	   includes	  the	  conditions	  of	   ‘being	  temporally	  novel’	   (both	  weak	  and	  strong	  versions),	  
Musgrave’s	   (1974)	   (and,	   according	   to	   Musgrave,	   Lakatos’	   1968)	   ‘not	   having	   been	   predicted	   by	   a	  
theory’s	  existing	  rivals’,	  Leplin’s	  (1997)	  hybrid	  condition	  ‘not	  having	  been	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  observational	  results	  and	  not	  having	  been	  predicted	  or	  explained	  by	  a	  theory’s	  existing	  rivals’	  and	  
potentially	  Barnes’	  (2008)	  ‘being	  endorsement-­‐novel	  relative	  to	  a	  scientist’.16	  In	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  
raised	  in	  this	  section,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  incidental	  predictivism	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  serve	  as	  
a	  basis	  for	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  confirmation.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	  other	  way	  to	  escape	  the	  first	  objection	  is	  to	  be	  a	  subjective	  confirmation	  theorist.	  Someone	  like	  Barnes	  
may	  argue	  that	  different	  people	  having	  conflicting	  judgments	  is	  nothing	  to	  worry	  a	  subjectivist	  about.	  Although	  
this	  reply	  does	  not	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  second	  objection	  it	  does	  raise	  the	  usual	  gamut	  of	  concerns	  associated	  with	  
subjective	  confirmation	  theories,	  e.g.	  how	  to	  establish	  rational	  inter-­‐subjective	  agreement.	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9.	  Cornerstones	  for	  an	  Objective	  Theory	  of	  Confirmation	  
It	  must	  seem	   like	  ages	  since	  we	   last	   spoke	  about	  objectivity	  and	  subjectivity	   in	  confirmation.	  Yet	  a	  
highly	   pertinent	   discussion	   has	   already	   been	   taking	   place	   right	   under	   our	   noses.	   The	   failures	   of	  
predictivism	   exposed	   in	   the	   last	   three	   sections	   are	   highly	   instructive	   in	   our	   search	   to	   lay	   some	  
foundations	  for	  an	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation.	  In	  this	  section	  and	  the	  next,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  place	  
some	  cornerstones	   in	   these	   foundations	   in	   the	   form	  of	   four	  desiderata	   that	  an	  adequate	  objective	  
theory	  of	  confirmation	  would	  need	  to	  satisfy.	  Though	  necessary,	  these	  desiderata	  are	  not	   intended	  
to	  be	  sufficient.	  
	  
We	  have	  already	   learned	  that	   incidental	  versions	  of	  predictivism	  are	  problematic	  precisely	  because	  
of	   their	   reliance	   on	   contingent	   considerations.	   Thus,	   although	   contingent	   considerations	   are	  
objective	   in	   character	   and	   can	   therefore	   be	   permitted	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   an	   objective	   theory	   of	  
confirmation,	   they	   are	   not	   the	   kind	   of	   considerations	   we	   want	   such	   a	   theory	   to	   possess.	   Ridding	  
ourselves	   from	  contingent	  considerations	   leaves	  only	   inferential	  and	  semantic	  ones	  to	   fall	  back	  on.	  
Our	   first	   desideratum	   then	   is	   to	   demand	   that	   an	   objective	   theory	   of	   confirmation	   articulate	  
appropriate	   inferential	   and	   semantic	   (but	   not	   contingent)	   conditions	   such	   that	   the	   confirmational	  
judgments	   it	   issues	   remain	   invariant	   under	   anything	   other	   than	   the	   evidence	   and	   the	   hypothesis	  
(plus	  any	  auxiliaries)	  in	  question.	  This	  demand	  was	  earlier	  encoded	  in	  Worrall’s	  dictum	  –	  which,	  it	  is	  
worth	   reminding,	   he	   unintentionally	   violates	   –	   ‘same	   evidence,	   same	   hypothesis	   (plus	   any	   of	   the	  
same	  auxiliaries),	  same	  confirmation’.	  
	  
A	   second	  desideratum	   is	   suggested	  by	  one	  of	   the	   failures	  of	  Worrall’s	   version	  of	  predictivism.	  You	  
may	   recall	   that	  Worrall	   attempts	   to	   save	   his	   view	   from	  Mayo’s	   counterexample	   by	   arguing	   that	   it	  
does	   not	   amount	   to	   a	   case	   of	   genuine	   confirmation.	   In	   doing	   so,	   Worrall	   was	   in	   effect	   trying	   to	  
dismiss	  the	  counterexample	  by	  conveniently	  reducing	  the	  set	  of	  cases	  that	  we	  may	  legitimately	  call	  
cases	   of	   genuine	   confirmation.	   His	   failure	   to	   provide	   warrant	   for	   this	   reduction	   should	   be	   a	  
cautionary	  tale	  for	  all	   those	  thinking	  of	  similar	  reduction	  moves.	  A	  theory	  of	  confirmation	  needs	  to	  
be	  able	   to	   tell	  us	  whether	  or	  not	  any	   given	  piece	  of	  evidence	  supports,	  opposes	  or	   is	  neutral	  with	  
respect	  to	  any	  given	  hypothesis.	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  comprehensiveness.	  Our	  second	  desideratum	  then	  
is	  that	  an	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation	  needs	  to	  be	  comprehensive.	  
	  
In	  Mayo’s	   counterexample	  we	   can	   also	   find	   hints	   of	   a	   third	   desideratum.	   The	   basic	   set-­‐up	   in	   that	  
counterexample	  is	  a	  true	  hypothesis	  constructed	  out	  of	  a	  complete	  set	  of	  data.	  But	  what	  constitutes	  
a	  complete	  set	  of	  data?	  Such	  a	  set	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  involving	  all	  the	  deductive	  consequences	  of	  
that	  hypothesis.	  Suppose	  E,	  the	  set	  used	  to	  construct	  T´,	  contains	  all	  the	  consequences	  of	  T´.	  Under	  
this	  set-­‐up,	  Worrall’s	  account	  dictates	  that	  E	  cannot	  provide	  any	  real,	   i.e.	  unconditional,	  support	  to	  
T´.	  Otherwise	  put,	  no	  consequence	  of	  T´	   lends	  support	  to	  it.	  This	  violates	  a	  highly	  intuitive	  principle	  
that	   is	  related,	  though	   it	   is	  weaker,	   to	  Hempel’s	  so-­‐called	   ‘entailment	  condition’.	   I	  call	  my	  principle	  
the	  ‘Consequence	  Principle’	  or	  (CP)	  for	  short.	  
	  
(CP):	  All	   (non-­‐trivial)	   deductive	   consequences	  of	   a	   hypothesis	   that	   are	   true	   confirm	   it	   and	   all	   false	  
ones	  disconfirm	  it.17	  
	  
Putting	  aside	  its	  intuitive	  appeal,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  put	  forth	  more	  robust	  reasons	  why	  we	  must	  pledge	  
our	   allegiance	   to	   this	   principle.	   Nobody	   would	   deny	   that	   any	   one	   (non-­‐trivial)	   consequence	   of	   a	  
hypothesis,	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  false,	  is	  enough	  to	  refute	  that	  hypothesis	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  formulated.	  But	  if	  
one	  consequence	  can	  refute	  a	  hypothesis,	  then	  surely	  hypotheses	  are	  never	  fully	  confirmed,	  i.e.	  are	  
not	  true	  without	  exception,	  prior	  to	  checking	  that	  consequence.	  Hence	  that	  consequence	  possesses	  
positive	  or	  negative	  confirmational	  weight	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  true	  or	  false	  respectively.	  Since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Trivial	  consequences	  include	  logical	  truths	  and	  irrelevant	  disjuncts.	  A	  good	  way	  to	  cash	  out	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘non-­‐trivial’	  consequences’	  is	  via	  the	  notion	  of	  relevant	  (as	  opposed	  to	  irrelevant)	  consequences.	  See	  the	  next	  
section	  for	  an	  exposition	  of	  this	  notion.	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this	   holds	   for	   any	   consequence,	   all	   consequences	   of	   a	   hypothesis	   possess	   positive	   or	   negative	  
confirmational	   weight.	   Equivalently,	   all	   true	   consequences	   of	   a	   hypothesis	   confirm	   it	   and	   all	   false	  
consequences	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  disconfirm	  it.	  That	  is,	  (CP)	  holds.	  
	  
Our	  third	  desideratum	  is	  adherence	  to	   (CP).	  An	  attractive	  by-­‐product	  of	   this	  adherence	   is	   that	   (CP)	  
conflicts	  with	  strong	  predictivism.	  The	  outlandishness	  of	  strong	  predictivism	  becomes	  evident	  when	  
one	  considers	   that	   the	  view	  violates	  not	  only	   (CP)	  but	  also	  a	  much	  weaker,	  and	   indeed	  very	  weak,	  
principle	  that	  I	  call	  the	  ‘Partial	  Consequence	  Principle’	  or	  (PCP)	  for	  short.	  
	  	  
(PCP):	  At	  least	  some	  (non-­‐trivial)	  deductive	  consequences	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  are	  true	  confirm	  it.	  
	  
Suppose	  that	  evidential	  set	  E	  contains	  all	  the	  (non-­‐trivial)	  consequences	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  H.	  Suppose,	  
furthermore,	   that	   E	   does	   not	   meet	   the	   distinctive	   condition(s)	   that	   make(s)	   a	   version	   of	   strong	  
predictivism	  the	  version	  it	  is.	  Then	  H	  cannot	  get	  any	  support	  from	  its	  consequences,	  thereby	  leading	  
to	  a	  violation	  of	   (PCP).	  As	  an	   illustration,	   consider	   the	   strong	   temporal	  novelty	  view.	   Its	  distinctive	  
condition	   holds	   that	   the	   only	   source	   of	   support	   for	   a	   hypothesis	   is	   from	   evidence	   that	   becomes	  
known	  after	  the	  hypothesis	  (plus	  any	  auxiliaries)	  was	  formulated	  or	  modified.	  Since	  by	  supposition	  E	  
violates	  this	  condition,	   its	  contents	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  support	  H.	  Moreover,	  since	  by	  supposition	  E	  
contains	   all	   the	   (non-­‐trivial)	   consequences	   of	  H	   this	   entails	   that	   no	   such	   consequence	   of	  H	   lends	  
support	   to	   it.	   Hence,	   the	   strong	   temporal	   novelty	   view	   runs	   afoul	   of	   (PCP).	   Structurally	   identical	  
arguments	  can	  be	  launched	  against	  other	  versions	  of	  strong	  predictivism.18	  Unless	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  
strong	  predictivism’s	  distinctive	  condition(s)	  is	  logically	  impossible,	  and,	  frankly,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  this	  
could	  be	  the	  case,	  there	  is	  no	  escape	  for	  the	  strong	  predictivist.19	  
	  
10.	  Post	  hoc	  and	  Other	  Monsters	  
No	   discussion	   of	   desiderata	   for	   an	   objective	   theory	   of	   confirmation	   would	   be	   complete	   without	  
saying	  something	  about	  the	  much-­‐derided	  post	  hoc	  monsters.	  Recollect	  that	  to	  meet	  the	  completion	  
challenge	  requires,	  among	  other	  things,	  dealing	  with	  the	  niggling	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not,	  and	  if	  so	  to	  
what	   extent,	   post	   hoc	  monsters	   can	   be	   confirmed.	   One	   approach	   to	   attain	   that	   goal	   has	   been	   to	  
either	  demonise	  or	  penalise	  post	  hoc-­‐ness	  itself.	  This	  approach	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  predictivist	  
movement.	   Strong	  versions	  of	  predictivism	  demonise	  post	  hoc-­‐ness	  by	  claiming	   that	  no	  post	  hocly	  
constructed	  or	  modified	  hypothesis	  earns	  support	  from	  accommodated	  evidence.	  Weak	  versions	  of	  
predictivism	   penalise	   it	   by	   claiming	   that	   no	   such	   hypothesis	   earns	   as	   much	   support	   from	  
accommodated	   evidence	   as	   one	   that	   is	   not	   so	   constructed.	   The	   various	   counterexamples	   to	  
predictivist	   views	  we	   saw	   earlier	   stand	   as	   a	   vivid	   reminder	   that	   not	   every	   post	   hocly	   constructed	  
hypothesis	  is	  a	  monster.	  Indeed,	  some	  of	  them	  may	  even	  be	  true	  hypotheses	  constructed	  from	  true	  
evidence.	  In	  short,	  the	  approach	  of	  demonising	  or	  penalising	  post	  hoc-­‐ness	  is	  not	  subtle	  enough.	  As	  
Allan	  Franklin	  jokingly	  put	  it	  in	  a	  title	  of	  a	  talk	  he	  delivered	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics:	  “Ad	  
hoc	  is	  not	  a	  four	  letter	  word”	  (see	  Worrall	  2006,	  p.	  42).	  	  
	  
Another	  approach	  is	  to	  target	  not	  post	  hoc-­‐ness	  itself	  but,	  more	  narrowly,	  post	  hoc	  monsters.	  Once	  
again	   two	   options	   are	   available.	   The	   first	   seeks	   to	   demonise	   post	   hoc	  monsters.	   Goodman	   (1983)	  
may	   be	   an	   advocate	   of	   this	   option.	   Although	   he	   doesn’t	   directly	   talk	   about	   post	   hoc	  monsters	   he	  
holds	  that	  hypotheses	  like	  the	  ones	  we	  considered	  earlier	  are	  not	  confirmed	  by	  their	  consequences.	  
The	   second	  seeks	   to	  penalise	  post	  hoc	  monsters.	   I	  will	  opt	   for	  a	  variant	  of	   the	   second	  option.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   Both	   referees	   raised	   the	   concern	   that	   examples	   like	   this	   are	   atypical	   in	   science	   since	  most	   cases	   involve	  
abductive	   inferences.	   One	   of	   them,	   referee	   2,	   also	   offered	   the	   right	   sort	   of	   reaction	   to	   this	   concern:	   Any	  
account	  of	   confirmation	   that	  purports	   to	  be	  universal	   should	  be	  able	   to	   cope	  with	  all	   cases,	   including	   those	  
where	  the	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  deductively	  inferred	  from	  the	  evidence.	  
19	  The	  failure	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  predictivism	  means	  that	  realists	  need	  a	  radical	  rethink	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
empirical	  success	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘no	  miracles	  argument’,	  since	  at	  present	  that	  notion	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  
ability	  of	  theories	  to	  make	  novel	  predictions.	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reason	   I	   reject	   the	   first	   is	   that	   in	  my	  view	  even	  monstrous	  hypotheses	  deserve	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  
accommodated	  evidence.	  Here’s	  why.	  Take	  hypothesis	  HAB:	  A	  ∧	  B.	  To	  determine	  the	  truth	  of	  HAB	  one	  
needs	  to	  determine	  both	  the	  truth	  of	  A	  and	  of	  B.	  Thus	  some	  support	  for	  HAB	  arises	  from	  the	  truth	  of	  
proposition	  A.	   This	   holds	   even	   if	  A	   is	   accommodated	   evidence	   and	   propositions	  A	   and	  B	   are	   post	  
hocly	  stitched	  together	  in	  a	  monstrous	  way.	  And	  since	  we	  haven’t	  specified	  the	  content	  of	  A	  or	  B,	  the	  
point	   is	   obviously	   general.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   route	   through	   which	   certain	   propositions	   get	   to	   be	  
included	  in	  a	  hypothesis,	  that	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  confirmed	  by	  the	  truth	  of	  those	  propositions.	  Thus,	  
no	  matter	  how	  counterintuitive	  it	  may	  sound,	  and	  subject	  to	  an	  important	  qualification	  I	  am	  about	  to	  
make,	  creationism	  (plus	  auxiliaries),	  Ptolemaic	  astronomy	  (plus	  auxiliaries),	  Velikovsky’s	  theory	  (plus	  
auxiliaries),	  etc.,	  earn	  confirmation	  from	  the	  true	  propositions	  they	  were	  designed	  to	  entail.	  	  
	  
The	  above	  argument	  dictates	  a	  disavowal	  of	  the	  completion	  challenge.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  news.	  We	  
have	  been	  on	   a	   direct	   collision	   course	  with	   the	   challenge	   for	   some	   time.	  Among	  other	   things,	   the	  
challenge	  conflicts	  with	  the	  first	  desideratum	  as	  that	  desideratum	  demands	  that	  an	  objective	  theory	  
of	  confirmation	  employs	  only	  inferential	  and	  semantic	  considerations.	  Where	  does	  this	  leave	  us?	  I	  do	  
not	  mean	  to	   imply	   that	   there	  are	  no	  genuine	  concerns	  behind	   the	  completion	  challenge	  or	  behind	  
the	  confirmation	  of	  post	  hoc	  monsters.	  Rather,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  propose	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  both	  
of	  these	  issues.	  	  
	  
Let	  us	  start	  with	  post	  hoc	  monsters.	  Monstrous	  hypotheses,	  like	  the	  great	  fictional	  monster	  in	  Mary	  
Shelley’s	  Frankenstein,	  are	  assembled	  out	  of	  a	  motley	  assortment	  of	  parts.	  Each	  individual	  part	  may	  
be	  fine	  on	  its	  own	  but	  when	  all	  the	  parts	  are	  put	  together	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  monster.	  Let	  us	  call	  a	  
hypothesis	   ‘monstrous’	   if	   and	   only	   if	   some	   of	   its	   content	   parts	   are	   disjointed.	   The	   notion	   of	  
disjointedness	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  as	  follows:	  Any	  two	  content	  parts	  expressed	  as	  propositions	  A,	  B	  are	  
disjointed	   if	   and	   only	   if	   P(α/β)	   =	   P(α)	   for	   all	   propositions	   α,	   β	   where	   α	   is	   a	   relevant	   deductive	  
consequence	  of	  A	  and	  β	  	  is	  a	  relevant	  deductive	  consequence	  of	  B.	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  about	  the	  
concept	   of	   disjointedness	   is	   that	   it	   is	   articulated	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   probabilistic	  
independence.	  We	  say	  that	  two	  propositions	  α,	  β	  are	  probabilistically	  independent	  just	  in	  case	  P(α/β)	  
=	  P(α).	  The	  concept	  of	  probabilistic	  independence	  is	  apt	  here	  because	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  express	  the	  idea	  
that	   two	   propositions	   are	   confirmationally	   unrelated.	   After	   all,	   the	   probability	   of	   the	   one	   is	   not	  
affected	  if	  we	  assume	  the	  truth	  (or	  falsity)	  of	  the	  other.20	  The	  second	  thing	  to	  note	  about	  the	  concept	  
of	  disjointedness	  is	  that	  to	  establish	  the	  confirmational	  unrelated-­‐ness	  between	  two	  propositions	  A,	  
B	   it	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  merely	  focus	  on	  the	  propositions	  themselves.	  We	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  
their	  deductive	   consequences.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   two	  propositions	  may	  be	  probabilistically	  
independent	  even	   though	   some	  of	   their	  deductive	   consequences	  are	  probabilistically	  dependent.21	  
To	  rule	  out	  such	  cases	  we	  must	  demand	  that	  probabilistic	  independence	  holds	  all	  the	  way	  down,	  that	  
is,	  between	  all	  –	  save	  for	  an	  exception	  to	  be	  discussed	  below	  –	  the	  deductive	  consequences	  of	  two	  
propositions.	  This	  demand	  is	  an	  apt	  way	  to	  express	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  part	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  one	  
proposition	  confirmationally	  affects	  any	  part	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  other	  proposition.	  The	  third	  and	  
final	   thing	   to	  note	   is	   that	   unless	  we	   restrict	   our	   evaluation	   to	   relevant	   deductive	   consequences	  of	  
propositions	   the	   concept	   of	   disjointedness	  would	   be	   unsatisfiable,	   i.e.	   no	   two	   propositions	  would	  
ever	  qualify	  as	  being	  disjointed.	  The	   idea	  of	  a	  relevant	  deductive	  consequence	   is	  fully	  developed	  in	  
Schurz	   (1991):	   “the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   given	   deduction	   is	   irrelevant	   iff	   the	   conclusion	   contains	   a	  
component	   [i.e.	   a	   formula]	   which	   may	   be	   replaced	   by	   any	   other	   formula,	   salva	   validitate	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  probabilities	  in	  question	  are	  objective,	  i.e.	  they	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  quality	  
of	  our	  assessments	  about	  disjointedness	  is	  thus	  dependent	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  information	  about	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  world.	  
21	  Here’s	  an	  example.	  Take	  A:	  A1	  ∧	  A2	  and	  B:	  A1	  ∧	  B1.	  Suppose	  that	  A1,	  A2	  are	  independent	  but	  also	  that	  A1,	  B1	  
are	  independent.	  We	  may	  assign	  values,	  e.g.	  P(A1)	  =	  0.5,	  P(A2)	  =	  0.5,	  P(B1)	  =	  0.5	  and	  P(B/A)	  =	  0.25,	  such	  that	  
P(A/B)	  =	  P(A)	  even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  proposition	  α	  that	  follows	  from	  A	  and	  a	  proposition	  β	  that	  follows	  from	  B,	  
in	  both	  cases	  this	  proposition	  being	  A1,	  such	  that	  P(α/β)	  ≠	  P(α).	  This	  is	  because	  P(A1/A1)	  =	  1	  and	  hence	  P(A1/A1)	  
≠	  P(A1).	  
Penultimate	  Draft	  –	  published	  in	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  2014,	  vol.	  45(1):	  70-­‐78.	  
deduction”	   (pp.	  400-­‐1).	  Here’s	  why	  we	  need	   it.	  Whatever	   the	  content	  of	  propositions	  A,	  B	  we	  can	  
always	  validly	  derive	  consequences	  that	  are	  common	  to	  both.	  For	  example,	  using	  the	  classical	  rule	  of	  
disjunction	  introduction	  we	  can	  derive	  the	  proposition	  A	  ∨	  B.	  The	  existence	  of	  such	  trivial	  common	  
consequences	  guarantees	  that	  there	  is	  a	  pair	  of	  propositions	  α,	  β	  for	  which	  P(α/β)	  ≠	  P(α)	  provided	  0	  
<	  P(α)	  <	  1.	  Obviously	  such	  consequences	  are	   irrelevant	  to	  the	  evaluation	  of	   the	  non-­‐disjointedness	  
between	  A	  and	  B.	  The	  restriction	  to	  relevant	  consequences	  forbids	  this	  kind	  of	  situation	  by	  ruling	  out	  
irrelevant	  formulas,	  i.e.	  formulas	  such	  as	  A	  ∨	  B.22	  
	  
Under	   this	   conception,	   monstrous	   hypotheses	   need	   not	   be	   post	   hocly	   constructed	   but	   also	   non-­‐
monstrous	  hypotheses	  may	  be	  post	  hocly	  constructed.	  Notice	  also	  that	  hypotheses	  may	  possess	  both	  
disjointed	  and	  non-­‐disjointed	  content	  parts.	  To	  be	  exact,	  since	  disjointedness	  and	  non-­‐disjointedness	  
are	   relations	   that	   hold	  between	   various	   content	  parts	   of	   hypotheses,	   the	   claim	   is	   that	   hypotheses	  
may	   possess	   content	   parts,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   disjointed	   and	   others	   non-­‐disjointed	   from	   other	  
content	   parts.	   It	   is	   thus	  more	   informative	   to	   speak	   about	  monstrous	   and	  non-­‐monstrous	   relations	  
between	  content	  parts	  of	  a	  given	  hypothesis	  rather	  than	  monstrous	  and	  non-­‐monstrous	  hypotheses.	  	  
	  
My	   suggestion	   on	   how	   to	   approach	   (post	   hoc	   and	   other)	   monsters	   involves	   the	   idea	   that	  
disjointedness	   forms	   a	   barrier	   against	   the	   spread	   of	   confirmation.23	   Take	   hypothesis	   HAB	   again.	  
Suppose	  that	  A	  and	  B	  are	  disjointed.	   If	   that	   is	   indeed	  the	  case,	   then	  finding	  out	  about	   the	  truth	  of	  
one	   (or	  any	  of	   its	   relevant	  deductive	  consequences)	  will	   leave	   the	   truth	  of	   the	  other	   (or	  any	  of	   its	  
relevant	   deductive	   consequences)	   unaffected.	   This	   means	   that	   there	   is	   a	   confirmation	   barrier	  
between	  A	  and	  B.	  Proposition	  A	  (or	  not-­‐A)	  confirms	  (or	  disconfirms)	  only	  that	  part	  of	  the	  content	  of	  
HAB	   that	   corresponds	   to	   itself,	   namely	  A.	   Ditto	   for	   proposition	  B.	   Thus	   even	   though	   (post	   hoc	   and	  
other)	  monsters	  get	  confirmed	  under	  my	  view,	  the	  confirmation	  they	  receive	  for	  a	  content	  part	  that	  
is	   disjointed	   from	   other	   content	   parts	   doesn’t	   spread	   to	   those	   other	   parts.	   This	   is	   unlike	   what	  
happens	  in	  cases	  of	  non-­‐monstrous	  relations	  between	  content	  parts	  of	  a	  given	  hypothesis	  where	  the	  
confirmation	   of	   a	   content	   part	   that	   is	   not	   disjointed	   from	   other	   content	   parts	   spreads	   to	   those	  
parts.24	  	  
	  
We	  are	  now	  ready	  to	  formulate	  our	  fourth	  desideratum:	  Any	  objective	  theory	  of	  confirmation	  must	  
ensure	   that	   support	   earned	   for	   disjointed	  parts	   does	   not	   spread	  beyond	   those	  parts.	   Taking	   stock	  
from	  all	   that	  has	  hitherto	  been	  said,	  we	  can	  propose	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  completion	  challenge	  
that	  applies	  only	  to	  objective	  theories	  of	  confirmation:	  Objective	  confirmation	  theorists	  must	  tell	  us	  
what	   is	   needed	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   four	   desiderata	   listed	   here	   to	   obtain	   a	   complete	   account	   of	  
confirmation.	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22	  For	  more	  examples	  of	  irrelevant	  consequences	  see	  Schurz	  (1991).	  
23	  This	  idea	  is	  similar	  to	  Goodman’s	  own	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  ad	  hoc-­‐ness	  “establishment	  of	  one	  component	  endows	  
the	  whole	  statement	  with	  no	  credibility	  that	  is	  transmitted	  to	  other	  component	  statements”	  (1983,	  pp.	  68-­‐69). 
Alas,	  Goodman	  and	  I	  don’t	  see	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye	  as	  he	  effectively	  rejects	  (CP).	  
24	  Note	  that	  it	  may	  spread	  to	  some	  sub-­‐parts	  but	  not	  others.	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